The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence View by Winick, Bruce J.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
1-1-1996
The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence View
Bruce J. Winick
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence View, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 249 (1996)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol50/iss2/2
University of Miami Law Review
VOLUME 50 JANUARY 1996 NUMBER 2
The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege:
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence View
BRUCE J. W1NICK*
Although all fifty states recognize some form of psychotherapist-
patient privilege,' the issue remains unresolved for the federal courts
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In the revisions to the Federal
Rules of Evidence drafted by the Judicial Conference and approved by
the Supreme Court in 1972, proposed Rule 504 explicitly provided for a
psychotherapist-patient privilege for confidential communications made
in connection with treatment.2  Congress, however, rejected this pro-
posed rule. Instead, Congress adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 501, a
general rule of privilege granting the federal courts wide discretion to
recognize evidentiary privileges "in the light of reason and experience." 4
The lower federal courts are split on whether this broad language should
be construed to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege,5 and now
* Copyright 1996 by Bruce J. Winick, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of
Law. Professor Winick would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Douglas Stransky,
Alina Perez, and Bill Collins.
1. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1356 & n.17 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 334
(1995); Anne D. Lamkin, Should Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Be Recognized?, 18 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 721, 723-25 (1995) (all fifty states and the District of Columbia have recognized
the psychotherapist-patient privilege in some form); e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 504 (1995); CAL.
EVID. CODE §§ 1010-26 (West 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-43-214 (1995); FLA. STAT.
§ 90.503 (1994); UTAH R. EvID. 506 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2. (1994).
2. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41
(1972). The proposed Rule set forth 10 specified privileges, including a psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Id. at 230-58.
3. Cf Act of Jan. 2, 1975, ch. 157, 88 Stat. 1926 (establishing rules of evidence, not
including proposed Rule 504).
4. FED. R. EVID. 501.
5. Compare In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992) and In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983) (both recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege) with
United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir.) (holding that the privilege does not apply in the
context of a child sex abuse case), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 176 (1994) and In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.) (no psychotherapist-patient privilege for target of grand
jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 906 (1989) and United States v. Corona 849 F.2d 562 (11 th Cir.
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the Supreme Court has granted review of a case that recognized the priv-
ilege and applied it to psychiatric social workers.6 In that case, Jaffee v.
Redmond, the Court will decide whether the psychotherapist-patient
privilege should be recognized in federal cases that do not require appli-
cation of state law on the issue.
The facts of the case are interesting and reveal the importance of
the privilege question. Mary Lou Redmond, an Illinois police officer,
responded to a call concerning a fight in progress at an apartment com-
plex. Arriving at the scene alone, she was advised that there had been a
stabbing in the building. In the events that followed, Officer Redmond
fired her gun and killed Ricky Allen.
The facts were in dispute. According to Redmond's testimony,
Allen was chasing another man in the building with a butcher knife and
had failed to heed the officer's warnings.7 In contrast, testimony by sev-
eral of Allen's relatives who were witnesses to the shooting suggested
that Allen was not armed and that Officer Redmond had emerged from
her police car with her gun drawn and shot Allen without warning. 8
Allen's surviving family members brought an action against Redmond
in federal district court in Illinois, alleging that the officer's unnecessary
use of force had infringed Allen's constitutional rights in violation of the
Federal Civil Rights Act and that she had caused his death in violation
of the Illinois wrongful death statute.'
Several days after the shooting, Officer Redmond began to visit
Karen Beyer, a clinical social worker licensed under the law of Illinois
and employed by the village for which Redmond worked.' 0 Redmond
saw her several times a week for counseling over approximately a six-
month period.'" The plaintiffs in the civil court action thereafter sought
discovery of statements Redmond had made to her therapist and copies
of Beyer's therapy notes. The trial court denied Redmond's motion to
quash these discovery orders on the basis of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege, finding that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not recognize
1988) (no physician-patient or psychotherapist privilege under the common law in federal
criminal trials), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1084 (1989) and United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752
(5th Cir.) (no physician-therapist privilege under the common law in federal criminal trials), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976).
6. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995).
7. Id. at 1349.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1348.
10. Id. at 1350. Under Illinois law, a licensed clinical social worker must have a master's or
doctoral degree in social work from an accredited graduate school of social work and at least three
years of supervised clinical social work experience. Id. at 1350 n.3 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
225, para. 20/9 (1994)).
11. Id. at 1350.
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extending such a privilege to psychiatric social workers. 2 When Beyer
refused to answer certain questions at the deposition and produce her
notes, the plaintiffs moved to compel, and the trial court ordered further
discovery on the issue. When Officer Redmond refused to answer ques-
tions concerning what she had said to the therapist about the shooting,
and Beyer produced only redacted portions of her therapy notes, the trial
court permitted a jury instruction allowing the jury to draw an adverse
inference resulting from Redmond's refusal to comply with discovery. 13
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the
trial court had erred in refusing to recognize a therapist-patient privilege
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4
In refusing to adopt a psychotherapist-patient privilege legisla-
tively, Congress expressed its intent "not to freeze the law of privi-
lege.""5 Instead, Congress left the issue to the federal courts, inviting
them to develop a federal common law of evidentiary privilege.' 6 With
the federal circuit courts of appeals divided, the Supreme Court now will
decide the issue: Should a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege be
recognized; and should it apply to psychiatric social workers?
The issue before the Supreme Court is not a constitutional question,
although it arises in a context in which the relevant constitutional values
push strongly in the direction of construing the Federal Rules to recog-
nize the privilege. Among those areas of constitutional privacy that are
a part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments is "the individual interest in avoiding dis-
12. Id. In contrast, Illinois recognizes a privilege for psychiatric social worker-patient
communiations. See id. at 1351 (citing ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 740, para. 110/2, 110/10 (1994)).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1358.
15. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980). In rejecting the proposed codification
contained in Rule 504, Congress did not intend to disapprove or foreclose any of the specified
privileges contained therein. The legislative history reflects that Congress did not reject proposed
Rule 504 on the merits, but that the resolution of the controversy it created would unduly delay the
adoption of the entire rules package that had been submitted. See S. REp. No. 1277, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1974); see also 120 CoNc. REc. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate) ("[T]he
privilege section of the rules of evidence generated more comment or controversy than any other
section.").
16. See S. RP. No. 1277, supra note 15, at 13:
It should be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule as to privileges,
the action of Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of
a psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or any other of the enumerated privileges
contained in the Supreme Court rules. Rather, our action should be understood as
reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential
relationship and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
See also 120 CONG. REc. 40,891 supra note 15 (statement of Rep. Hungate) ("Rule 501 is not
intended to freeze the law of privilege as it now exists.").
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closure of personal matters." 7 Another is the liberty interest in making
personal health care decisions.' 8 A refusal to recognize the therapist-
patient privilege would frustrate both these interests. But the issue
before the Court is not the constitutionality of a federal rule of evidence
denying the privilege. The Federal Rules do no such thing. Indeed,
they explicitly leave open issues of evidentiary privilege, allowing the
federal courts the authority to develop a federal common law of privi-
lege. 19 However, because recognizing a therapist-patient privilege
would further these constitutional values, and rejecting it would frustrate
them, the task of rule construction inevitably will be affected by the
constitutional questions lurking in the background. While they do not
decide the issue, these constitutional values certainly point toward rec-
ognition of the privilege.
Apart from constitutional considerations, what factors should guide
the Court in reaching its decision? The recognition of any privilege, by
depriving the courts of probative evidence, will inevitably harm the
truth-determination process. The question is whether the value of recog-
nizing a specific privilege outweighs this harm.20
In addressing the question presented in Jaffee v. Redmond-
whether the Federal Rules of Evidence should be construed to permit a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, and if so, whether it should extend to
psychiatric social workers-the Court is directed to construe the federal
rules in a way that permits the development of a common law of federal
evidence in accordance with "reason and experience."'" These words
17. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
18. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992) (recognizing a constitutional
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 229 (1990) (same); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
("The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."); Bruce J. Winick, On
Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1732-35 (1992)
(discussing liberty interest in making personal health care decisions).
19. FED. R. EVID. 501.
20. In a classic formulation of the standard for recognition of an evidentiary privilege, Dean
Wigmore stated:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961).
21. Id.
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suggest that the Court should be sensitive to the consequences of its
action. "The life of the law," Holmes told us, "has not been logic: it has
been experience."22 Among the many public policy considerations that
might enter into this determination, the Court should examine closely
the therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences of its decision.2 3 A ther-
apeutic jurisprudence analysis of the issues before the Court suggests
that significant positive therapeutic consequences would follow if the
psychotherapist-patient privilege were to be recognized, and correspond-
ing negative therapeutic consequences would ensue if it is not.
In an increasingly complex and stressful society, characterized by
erosion of family and community, it is not surprising that mental illness
is so prevalent. A recent study estimated that more than fifty-two mil-
lion Americans suffer from a specific diagnosable mental disorder each
year.24 This represents more than twenty-eight percent of the adult pop-
ulation, or more than one in four.2 5 Moreover, the statistics present a
conservative picture.26 Close to nine million of those with mental disor-
der develop the problem for the first time each year.27 Another eight
million of these suffer from a relapse of a condition developed earlier.2"
This study also estimated that of the more than fifty-two million Ameri-
cans who suffer from mental illness each year, only 28.5 percent get
help.29
Were more to get help, the many individual and social problems
engendered by this high prevalence rate of mental illness would be con-
siderably reduced. Were mental health treatment and counseling to be
sought by more Americans, many of the severe social problems that
characterize modem life-including divorce, child abuse and neglect,
alcoholism and drug abuse, homelessness, poverty, employee absentee-
22. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Gryphon Editions 1982) (1881).
23. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (1991) (analyzing law's role as a therapeutic agent and suggesting that social
science be used to assess the impact of law on the mental and physical health of the people it
affects); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David
B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., forthcoming 1996) (containing examples of therapeutic
jurisprudence analysis of various areas of the law as well as commentary on therapeutic
jurisprudence).
24. See Darrel A. Regier et al., The de Facto U.S. Mental and Addictive Disorders Service
System, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 85, 88 (1993); see also Daniel Goleman, Mental
Disorders Common, but Few Get Treatment, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 1993, at C13
(discussing study by Regier).
25. Regier et al., supra note 24, at 88, 90.
26. The researchers counted only people who met all the official psychiatric diagnostic
criteria for a disorder. People with "problems in living," such as marital difficulties, were
excluded. Goleman, supra note 24, at C13.
27. Regier et al., supra note 24, at 88.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 90.
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ism, and even crime-would be diminished. Many mental health
problems are preventable with only a minimal amount of counseling that
can help the individual to solve a personal problem, reduce stress, or
cope with difficulties. Many mental disorders respond effectively to the
broad range of treatment modalities currently available.3 0
Why, then, don't more people with mental health problems seek
treatment, and how can we encourage more of them to do so? While at
one level, the problem may involve the supply of therapists and the
expense of obtaining their services, at another it may involve concern,
particularly in our increasingly litigious society, that the most intimate
and personal details of human life, revealed within the therapeutic rela-
tionship, might be the subject of subpoena and court-ordered disclosure.
The existing empirical literature is inconclusive concerning
whether legal recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege is an
important factor in whether people seek mental health treatment. Some
studies suggest that people generally are unaware of legal rules relating
to evidentiary privileges for professional communications and that their
behavior in regard to obtaining or avoiding treatment is little affected by
such legal rules.3 ' This is consistent with studies showing little impact
on patients' behavior in seeking therapy resulting from the Tarasoff
rule, 2 which imposes a duty on therapists to warn individuals who are at
risk of harm at the hands of their patients when revelations in therapy
suggest such a threat.33 These findings, however, are far from
conclusive.34
Professors Daniel Shuman and Myron Weiner have performed
three separate studies of the consequences of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.35 The first study sought to assess the impact of a Texas statute
30. See Allen E. Bergin & Michael J. Lambert, The Effectiveness of Psychotherapy, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE 3, 143 (Allen E. Bergin & Sol L.
Garfield eds., 4th ed. 1994).
3 1. See Daniel W. Shuman et al., The Privilege Study (Part III): Psychotherapist-Patient
Communications in Canada, 9 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 393 (1986); Daniel W. Shuman & Myron
F. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REv. 893 (1982); Myron S. Weiner & Daniel W. Shuman, Privilege-A
Comparative Study, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 373 (1984).
32. See James C. Beck, When the Patient Threatens Violence: An Empirical Study of the
Clinical Practice After Tarasoff, 10 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 189 (1982); Shuman &
Wiener, supra note 31, at 914-15; Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of
Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165 (1978).
33. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d. 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). The court
vacated and modified its previous opinion, Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 F.2d 553
(Cal. 1974) (en banc), after rehearing. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 334.
34. See Shuman & Weiner, supra note 3 1, at 927 (concluding that both sides of the debate
"have overstated their cases").
35. See supra note 31.
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that, for the first time, had adopted a psychotherapist-patient privilege.36
Shuman and Weiner administered questionnaires to groups of psychia-
trists, patients, laypersons (a sample of evening adult education stu-
dents), and judges. The authors found that, at the outset of therapy,
confidentiality was articulated as a concern by only fifty-four percent of
the patients, and that only twenty-seven percent of the patients were
aware of the new psychotherapist-patient privilege. 37 In addition, fifty-
five percent of the psychiatrists reported themselves as unaware of the
existence of the new privilege,38 while seventy-four percent of those in
the layperson sample were unaware of the privilege.39
Laypersons not in therapy were used to assess the extent to which a
privilege would be a significant factor in their hypothetical decision
whether to enter therapy should they encounter problems.40 The authors
concluded that patients are probably not deterred from seeking therapy
to any significant degree by the absence of a privilege.41 Because
ninety-three percent of the lay sample would have sought therapy for
serious emotional problems, even though seventy-four percent of the
group were unaware of the existence of the privilege, the authors con-
cluded that "the existence of a privilege could not have provided an
incentive or avoided a barrier to therapy for these persons." 42
Even leaving aside a variety of methodological problems with this
study-small sample sizes, large non-response rates, selection of the
patient sample by the psychiatrists in a non-randomized fashion, and the
assumption that lay adult education students without mental health
problems behave in a way similar to individuals that have such
problems-the data do not seem to support the conclusion that the privi-
lege does not play an important role in patient decisionmaking about
whether to seek therapy. Let us assume that patients generally are una-
ware of the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, as this
Texas study demonstrated soon after enactment of a statute adopting
such a privilege. If they are unaware of the privilege, then of course it
would not affect their decisions whether to seek therapy. Can it be
assumed, however, that patients will be unaware of the privilege ques-
tion once the Supreme Court has decided the issue and it receives the
usual extensive publicity that follows Supreme Court decisions on mat-
ters of public interest? The important question, left unanswered by this
36. Shuman & Weiner, supra note 31, at 896-97.
37. Id. at 920.
38. Id. at 938.
39. Id. at 930.
40. Id. at 919.
41. Id. at 924-25.
42. Id. at 925.
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research, is whether a Supreme Court opinion on this question will sig-
nificantly increase awareness of the privilege, and whether such aware-
ness will affect patient decisionmaking concerning whether to seek
therapy. A new state statutory enactment of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege is unlikely to make the front pages or the evening news, while
a Supreme Court decision denying such a privilege will.
In fact, the Shuman and Wiener research in Texas suggests that
people's awareness of the absence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
will dramatically affect their behavior. Without mentioning the exist-
ence of a privilege, the lay group was asked whether they would reveal
to a therapist information concerning a series of subjects that included
speeding, cheating on income taxes, physical violence, sexual fantasies,
and work failure. A high percentage responded that they would reveal
information concerning all of these categories. The group was then
asked whether they would discuss these issues with a therapist in the
absence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, and "the response rate
declined markedly."4 3 Thus, if patients become aware of the absence of
a privilege, as it can be assumed they would were the Supreme Court to
decide against the privilege, the Shuman and Wiener study suggests that
patient behavior would very much be affected.
Shuman and Wiener conducted a second study relating to privilege
in South Carolina and West Virginia, which at the time were the only
two states that did not have a psychotherapist-patient privilege.' This
study suffered from similar methodological problems as the Texas study,
and had an even higher non-response rate.45 Once again, patients were
shown to be unaware of the status of the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege in their state. Forty-one percent of the South Carolina/West Vir-
ginia patients incorrectly assumed that they possessed a privilege.46 The
authors again concluded that the existence of the privilege has little
effect on patient decisionmaking concerning whether to enter therapy,
but their conclusion is subject to the same limitations as previously dis-
cussed with regard to the Texas study. One may question whether the
widespread misunderstanding on the part of patients in South Carolina
and West Virginia concerning the existence of the privilege would apply
after a high visibility Supreme Court decision rejecting a privilege. This
study, therefore, also provides little support for a conclusion that patient
43. Id. at 919-20. The items most affected by this change in response rate had legal
consequences. Id.
44. Wiener & Shuman, supra note 31, at 374-78.
45. Id. at 377 (43% of patients in the South Carolina and West Virginia studies responded to
questionnaires, compared to 51% in Texas; 45% of therapists in the Texas study responded,
compared to only 19% in the South Carolina and West Virginia study).
46. Id. at 381.
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behavior concerning therapy would be unaffected by a Supreme Court
decision rejecting the privilege.
In a third study, Shuman, Wiener, and a Canadian colleague, Pro-
fessor Gilbert Pinard, compared responses by psychiatrists, patients,
judges, and a lay group of university students in two Canadian prov-
inces, Ontario, which had no privilege, and Quebec, which had a form of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 47 Here, too, the study found wide-
spread lack of awareness concerning the presence or absence of a privi-
lege, leading the authors to conclude that privilege had little bearing on
patient decisionmaking concerning therapy.4 8 Once again, it is not sur-
prising that a factor concerning which patients were unaware or con-
fused had little bearing on their decisionmaking. Once again, it may be
questioned whether a high visibility Supreme Court decision on the
issue would give rise to an entirely different situation. In summary,
these three studies shed little light on the question of whether a Supreme
Court decision rejecting existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
would affect patient decisionmaking concerning whether to enter
therapy.
Even though the empirical evidence is inconclusive, an adverse
impact on patients' willingness to enter therapy can be hypothesized
should the Supreme Court reject the privilege. For most people, public
revelation of private therapy disclosures would be extremely unpleasant
and embarrassing. Moreover, it could produce significant negative con-
sequences that might be harmful to them in such important areas of their
lives as the family and the workplace. As a result, behavioral psychol-
ogy would predict that people who are aware of this possibility may be
seriously deterred from engaging in therapy.
It stands to reason that this consideration will affect human behav-
ior in precisely this way. The case before the Court is illustrative.
Would a member of a police force involved in a shooting that became
the subject of a lawsuit for police misconduct seek out counseling con-
cerning his or her job-related stress if intimate details revealed in ther-
apy could be the subject of an evidentiary fishing expedition conducted
by the civil plaintiff? Would the victim of a sexual assault seek counsel-
ing if she knew that the perpetrator's attorney could seek discovery of
what she said in therapy in order to impeach her with it at trial? Would
individuals undergoing the heartache and stress of divorce seek treat-
ment knowing that their intimate disclosures could be used in divorce
litigation or could be sought by the adverse spouse for use as a club in
settlement negotiations?
47. Shuman et al., supra note 31, at 393.
48. Id. at 411-12.
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The potential of future negative consequences will affect human
behavior only if people can predict those consequences and are aware of
the risk of their occurrence. Behavior is not reflexive or automatic; it is
cognitively mediated.49 Shuman and Weiner's research suggests that
people are unaware of the existence or nonexistence of the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege, 0 but the previous analysis questions this conclu-
sion in the context of Supreme Court resolution of the privilege
question.
While the issue of the psychotherapist-patient privilege may not
occur to some people, it doubtless would be a concern to many deciding
on whether to seek needed mental health treatment.-" The publicity that
surely would follow a Supreme Court decision on whether the privilege
should be recognized will predictably bring the issue to heightened pub-
lic awareness. Were the Court to reject the existence of the privilege,
people considering whether to enter therapy would learn of it. Not only
would they learn of it through the usual intense media coverage of
Supreme Court decisions on issues of public interest, but clinicians
would have an ethical duty to divulge to their patients that patient-thera-
pist communications may not be totally confidential, and may be
revealed in judicial proceedings.5 2 This will have a predictable chilling
49. Albert Bandura, Behavior Theory and the Models of Man, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 859,
860 (1974); Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the Government as
a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MiAMI L. REV. 737, 755 (1991).
50. See Shuman et al., supra note 31, at 411-12; Shuman & Weiner, supra note 31. at 930;
Weiner & Shuman, supra note 31, at 381. Whether they understand the distinction between
confidentiality and the existence of an evidentiary privilege, other empirical evidence strongly
suggests that patients believe that what they tell their psychotherapists will be held in strictest
confidence. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Confidentiality: An Empirical Test of the Utilitarian
Perspective, 12 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 109, 110 (1984) (reviewing studies).
51. See 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 504-18
(1995) ("Unlike the patient with physical ailments or complaints, who will likely consult a
physician regardless of whether confidentiality is guaranteed, a neurotic or psychotic individual
may seek help only if he is assured that his confidences will not be divulged, even in a
courtroom."); GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 45, at 92 (1960)
[hereinafter GAP REPORT], cited with approval in Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence
for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 367 (1971) (Advisory Comm.
Notes), Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REv. 175,
184 (1960).
52. The Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, Standard 5.01, provides:
(a) Psychologists discuss with persons and organizations with whom they
establish a scientific or professional relationship (including, to the extent feasible,
minors and their legal representatives) (1) the relevant limitations on confidentiality,
including limitations where applicable in group, marital, and family therapy or in
organizational consulting, and (2) the foreseeable uses of the information generated
through their services.
(b) Unless it is not feasible or is contraindicated, the discussion of
confidentiality occurs at the outset of the relationship and thereafter as new
circumstances may warrant.
[Vol. 50:249
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effect on the willingness of individuals to enter or remain in therapy.
At precisely the time when more Americans need the services of
mental health professionals, a total rejection by the Supreme Court of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege will, therefore, have the predictable
effect of discouraging those seeking such professional help. One reason
that people with mental health problems do not seek treatment relates to
the historic stigma associated with mental illness.53 Although there have
been many efforts to destigmatize mental illness, sadly such stigma con-
tinues. As a result, many people with mental health problems will enter
therapy only if they can be assured that their doing so will not come to
public attention. Should the Supreme Court reject the existence of a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, people with mental health problems
concerned about avoiding the embarrassment and social disadvantages
of stigmatization will be discouraged from entering therapy.
Rejection by the Supreme Court of a psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege can therefore have significant negative effects on the mental health
of the nation. People with mental health problems will be discouraged
from seeking therapy and their problems will only worsen, sometimes
causing social catastrophe. This is a problem that affects more than just
the one in four adult Americans suffering from a diagnosable mental
disorder. Most of us will face one or more devastating experiences in
our lives--death of a loved one, loss of a job, divorce, becoming the
victim of a crime or a natural disaster, for example. Many are unable
successfully to cope with these events, and could benefit from profes-
sional counseling. Research is increasingly showing that talking about
these difficulties can improve mental health, while not talking about
Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, Standard 5.01, in 47 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST
1597, 1606 (1992). Similarly, the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers
provides that "[tihe social worker should inform clients fully about the limits of confidentiality in
a given situation, the purposes for which information is obtained, and how it may be used."
NATIONAL ASS'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, NASW CODE OF ETHICS § II.H.2 (1990).
53. See REPORT OF THE TASK PANEL ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND USE OF MEDIA FOR
PROMOTION OF MENTAL HEALTH, in 4 TASK PANEL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH 1864, 1870 (1978); Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of
Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
6, I1 n.40 (1995). Former patients have eloquently articulated the personal costs of the stigma of
mental illness. See JUDI CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN 107-11 (1978); Betty Blaska, First Account:
What It Is Like To Be Treated Like a CMI, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 173 (1991); Judi Chamberlin,
The Ex-Patients Movement: Where We've Been and Where We're Going, II J. MIND & BEHAV.
323, 324-25 (1990). The National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI), the nation's largest
support and advocacy organization for individuals with mental illness and their families, has
recently launched a comprehensive, five-year education campaign, endorsed by the National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), to fight stigma and discrimination. National Anti-
Discrimination Campaign Announced at Convention, 17 NAMI ADVOCATE 1, July-Aug. 1995, at
1,4.
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them may be unhealthy in a number of respects.54 Psychologist James
Pennebaker's research shows that the act of inhibition of thoughts and
feelings imposes severe stress that, over time, gradually undermines the
body's defenses, affecting immune function, the actions of the heart and
vascular systems, and even the biochemical workings of the brain and
nervous systems." While inhibition is harmful, Professor Pennebaker
has found that confiding our hidden thoughts and feelings can have
profound health benefits.5 6
In general, it is best for the individual to disclose serious problems
to a professional therapist, one licensed under state law who by reason
of education and training has been certified as competent to perform this
special function. Yet, the willingness of many people to seek out such
professional therapists will be undermined to the extent they lack confi-
dence in the therapist's ability to maintain confidentiality. Recognition
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege will bolster this confidence.
Refusing to do so may destroy it.
Moreover, a rejection of the privilege may seriously diminish the
effectiveness of therapy for individuals who are in or decide to under-
take therapy. It can be predicted that many patients, out of concern for
potential disclosure, will inhibit their own disclosure to the therapist.
Shuman and Weiner's research demonstrates this by showing a signifi-
cant diminution in patients' willingness to disclose information to a ther-
apist once they are told that such information will not be privileged.57
The "fundamental rule" of psychotherapy, Freud wrote, is that the
patient be totally forthcoming with the therapist, revealing everything no
matter how insignificant it may seem. 8 Inhibition by the patient thus
can thus doom the therapeutic enterprise.
To succeed, mental health treatment requires a high degree of trust
and confidence by the patient in the therapist.5 9 Establishing this trust
54. See generally JAMES W. PENNEBAKER, OPENING UP: THE HEALING POWER OF CONFIDING
IN OTHERS (1990) (reporting extensive research).
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id. at 14, 21.
57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
58. See 23 SIGMUND FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, in STANDARD EDITION OF THE
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WOPRKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 174 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1964);
see also GAP REPORT, supra note 51 (The psychiatrist's "capacity to help his patients is
completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if
not impossible for him to function without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality and,
indeed, privileged communication.").
59. See Mark B. DeKraai & Bruce D. Sales, Privileged Communications of Psychologists, 13
PROF. PSYCHOLOGIST 372, 372 (1982) (the establishment of a relationship of trust between client
and therapist "has been deemed so essential by some that it has been argued that psychotherapy is
rendered worthless in its absence"); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health
Treatment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99, 111-12
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and confidence at the outset of the therapeutic relationship may be
essential for its ultimate success.6° It is precisely at this point that a
therapist will feel ethically obligated to reveal to the patient that the
confidentiality of the patient's communications cannot be fully pro-
tected.61 For at least some patients, the specter of their therapist as a
weapon in the hands of an adversary in litigation will prevent formation
of the therapeutic alliance.62 Concern about disclosure of intimate and
personal information confided in a therapist thus can have profoundly
antitherapeutic effects for the individual, producing a distrust of the ther-
apist that can make the therapeutic process impossible.
Would any positive therapeutic consequences result from a decision
denying recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege? Jeffrey
Klotz suggests that there may be potential therapeutic advantages in
eliminating the privilege in certain circumstances.63 He urges a future
crimes exception, under which patient communications of a desire or
intent to commit a crime would be exempt from the privilege. Klotz
hypothesizes that patients, aware that their disclosures concerning a
future crime could be used against them in court, may avoid behavior
that might necessitate judicial intervention. 64 Fear of future disclosure,
in Klotz's view, could have the therapeutic effect of deterring future
criminal conduct. Klotz's proposal already is largely reflected in state
law exceptions to the privilege.65 Would such a future crimes exception
(1994); see also Ryan D. Jagim et al., Mental Health Professionals' Attitudes Toward
Confidentiality, Privilege, and Third Party Disclosure, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGIST 458, 458-59
(1978) ("The concept of confidentiality of client-therapist communications is at the core of the
psychotherapeutic relationship.").
60. Winick, supra note 59, at 111-14.
61. "Mental health professionals must alert their patients at the outset of therapy about special
conditions under which complete confidentiality cannot be maintained." REPORT OF THE TASK
PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHIcAL ISSUES, in 4 TASK PANEL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 53, at 1399; see also supra note 52
(quoting ethical guidelines of psychologists and social workers).
62. See Winick, supra note 59, at 113-14.
63. Jeffrey A. Klotz, Limiting the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Therapeutic
Potential, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 416 (1991).
64. Id. at 429.
65. Id. at 429 n.58; see, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 504(d)(2) (1995) ("crime or fraud"); CAL.
EvID. CODE § 1018 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146c(b)(3) ("risk of imminent personal
injury... or risk of imminent injury to... property"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 740, para. 110/11 (vi)
(1993) (threats of violence); LA. CODE EvID. 510(B)(2)(e), (C)(2)(b) (1995); MAss. GEN. L. ch.
112, § 129A(2)-(3) (1991) (threat or clear and present danger that patient will kill or inflict serious
injury); 1995 NEV. STAT. 640, § 19 ("immediate threat that the patient will harm himself or other
persons"), R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-37.3-4(4) (Supp. 1994) (when third party "is in danger from a
patient"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95(C)(3) (Supp. 1994) ("intention... to commit a crime or
harm himself"); W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1(b)(4) (1992) "[t]o protect against a clear and substantial
danger of imminent injury"); Wvo. STAT. § 33-27-123(a)(iv) (Supp. 1995) (immediate threat of
physical violence against a readily identifiable victim"); see also United States v. Snelenberger, 24
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to the privilege have this desired effect? Would it instead deter patients
who intend to commit a crime from entering therapy, or from disclosing
their intentions in therapy, in either case foreclosing the potential that a
therapeutic intervention might prevent the crime? These are interesting
and unresolved empirical questions that deserve investigation.
In any event, even if Klotz is correct and if more criminal behavior
can be avoided by recognizing this exception than by refusing to do so,
allowing a future crimes exception does not argue for rejecting the privi-
lege altogether. The case before the Supreme Court does not require
resolution of whether a future crimes exception should be recognized. It
merely involves the question of whether the Federal Rules of Evidence
should be read to permit a general privilege for psychotherapist-patient
communications. Whether a future crimes exception or other exceptions
should be recognized can await another day, perhaps when more infor-
mation concerning the consequences of various exceptions will be avail-
able. The privilege recognized by the court of appeals in Jaffee v.
Redmond is not an absolute one, but expressly contemplates possible
exceptions.66 The Supreme Court, therefore, can affirm Jaffee's general
recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege and leave the details of
when it should be overcome by countervailing needs to the lower federal
courts to be developed in light of "reason and experience. 67
That the psychotherapist-patient privilege recognized by Jaffe is
less than absolute does not undermine its therapeutic potential. The
court of appeals acknowledged that, in appropriate circumstances, the
need for the information sought could outweigh the interest in preserv-
ing confidentiality. 6 Allowing the trial judge to engage in this weighing
process strikes the balance appropriately between the interest in ascer-
taining truth and the privacy and therapeutic concerns involved. In this
sense, the privilege functions as a cloak of confidentiality, generally pre-
serving the privacy of sensitive disclosures made in therapy, but a cloak
that can be removed in appropriate circumstances when the demands of
the justice system require it. The privilege makes such communications
presumptively protected from disclosure and, in effect, places on the
party seeking disclosure the burden of demonstrating the heightened rel-
evance to the proceedings of obtaining the information in question.
Only when such information is essential to the proof of crucial facts
should the intimacy of the therapeutic relationship be invaded.
F.3d 799, 802 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying future crimes exception under FED. R. EViD. 501), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 433 (1994).
66. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357 (7th Cir. 1995).
67. FED. R. EVID. 501.
68. See Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357.
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Even though the psychotherapist-patient privilege would not be
absolute, recognition of its existence by the Supreme Court would pro-
vide an important signal to those considering whether to enter therapy
that the confidentiality of their disclosures will generally be protected.
The opposite signal would encourage litigants to seek confidential infor-
mation from therapists even when such information is not crucial, as a
means of harassment and in an effort to force a settlement that would
avoid disclosure of embarrassing or personal information. The absence
of a privilege would encourage significant abuse by unscrupulous law-
yers that will be difficult and expensive for trial judges to control.
All fifty states recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege.69
Although state law recognizes the privilege, if the Supreme Court were
to refuse to do so under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a therapist would
feel obligated to reveal to a patient that the federal courts do not protect
the privilege.7 ° When a patient first seeks therapy and the therapist is
faced with the ethical duty of discussing confidentiality and its possible
exceptions, it will be difficult to predict, if a lawsuit involving the
patient should occur, whether it will be in state court or federal court.7'
The uncertainty engendered by this disclosure alone could have a serious
deterrent effect on a patient's willingness to enter therapy and could
therefore frustrate state policy that recognizes the privilege in order to
foster mental health and to protect personal privacy.
Refusing to recognize the privilege thus will impose a number of
serious social costs. People in need of therapy will be deterred from
seeking it, and those already in therapy may participate in it with less
than the full candor needed for treatment success. Against these costs
must be weighed the loss of probative evidence. But how much proba-
tive evidence will be lost by recognition of a psychotherapist patient
privilege? Because rejection of the privilege would deter patients from
entering therapy or from participating in it with full candor, the very
evidence sought-the patient's confidential communications to the ther-
apist-would never have come into existence in the first place. As a
result, refusal to recognize the privilege will not materially assist the
truth-determination process. Because little evidence will accordingly be
69. See id. at 1356; see also sources cited supra note 1.
70. Given the unanimity in the states concerning recognizing the privilege under state law,
rejection of the privilege for the federal courts can produce the additional undesirable effect of
promoting forum shopping. Cf Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71. In cases in which the parties to a lawsuit are citizens of different states or in which the
claim arises under federal law (such as the Federal Civil Rights claim involved in Jaffee), a civil
plaintiff may file suit in either state or federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1995) (federal
question jurisdiction); id. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction).
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lost, the therapeutic benefits of recognizing the privilege outweigh the
social costs of non-recognition.
If the privilege is recognized, it should be extended to all mental
health professionals licensed by the state, including psychiatric social
workers. Given the largely unmet mental health needs of the nation, it is
essential that psychiatric social workers play the significant therapeutic
role that this expanding profession has served so well in recent years.
There are approximately 30,642 psychiatrists, 56,000 psychologists and
81,000 psychiatric social workers practicing mental health counseling
today.72 In reality, an increasing amount of patient contact involves psy-
chiatric social workers, rather than psychiatrists and psychologists. Rec-
ognizing a privilege that extends to psychiatrists alone, or to
psychiatrists and psychologists, but not to psychiatric social workers,
would in effect create a second-class professional relationship for people
lacking the financial means to hire the more expensive psychiatrist or
psychologist. The psychiatric social worker has become "the poor per-
son's psychiatrist. '73 In addition to being unwise and antitherapeutic,
construing the privilege not to extend to psychiatric social workers thus
would raise grave equal protection problems. In fashioning a privilege,
the Court should focus on the function of the counseling relationship
rather than on the identity of the counselor. Focusing on the purpose of
the communication rather than on the occupation of the counselor avoids
the social inequality created by granting a privilege to one type of coun-
selor, such as psychiatrists and psychologists whose clients tend to be
more affluent, while denying the privilege to another type, such as social
workers, whose clients tend to be poor.74
The Supreme Court will not decide Jaffee v. Redmond on the basis
of equal protection. But the equal protection tensions that would be cre-
ated by recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege that did not
extend to licensed psychiatric social workers argue strongly for a more
extensive privilege. There simply is no avoiding the reality that our
nation's mental health needs have eclipsed the ability of psychiatrists
and psychologists to meet them. More and more services will be deliv-
ered by psychiatric social workers. More and more people need and will
72. Thomas H. Dial et al., Human Resources in Mental Health, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED
STATES 1990, at 196, 208 (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Mary A. Sonnenschein eds., 1990).
73. See Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358 n.19 (citing Developments in the Law-Privileged
Communications, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1530, 1550 (1985)); see also Comment, Underprivileged
Communications: Extension of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric
Social Workers, 61 CAL. L. Rv. 1050, 1050 (1973).
74. See Kerry L. Morse, Note, A Uniform Testimonial Privilege for Mental Health
Professionals, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 741, 745-47 (1990).
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accept their services. It is in the mental health interests of the nation to
promote their role.
Viewed in this light, there simply is no basis for concluding that
psychiatrists and psychologists require the cloak of confidentiality to
play their role effectively but that psychiatric social workers do not.
With the exception of the medication that physicians alone may pre-
scribe, the treatment approaches utilized by psychiatrists, psychologists,
and psychiatric social workers do not differ significantly. Apart from
the organic interventions reserved for psychiatrists, the practice of verbal
psychotherapy, although it may differ based upon the therapist's particu-
lar clinical orientation, will not vary based on professional lines. All
forms of psychotherapy require trust and confidence by the patient in the
clinician. To the extent that the privilege is based upon a desire to foster
the therapeutic relationship, there can be no principle basis for distin-
guishing psychotherapists based upon professional discipline. Given the
large unmet mental health needs of the nation, we should not undermine
the ability of psychiatric social workers to help in the battle.
The Supreme Court, therefore, should read the Federal Rules of
Evidence to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege that includes
psychiatric social workers. Fine-tuning of the privilege, including the
circumstances in which it should be outweighed in particular cases, may
be left for future decision. Endorsement by the Court of a general privi-
lege for therapist-patient communications would bring federal practice
in line with the approach uniformly followed in the states and would
best serve both constitutional and therapeutic values.
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